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Edward Said’s last published work, which went to press weeks before his death in 
September 2003, was Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004). I want to 
read this book not as the summation of Said’s fifty years of engagement with 
literary and cultural studies and with the plight of the Palestinians but as an 
engagement with a problematic that has been at the centre of his writings, and 
by extension at the centre of Salman Rushdie’s creative output. Said refers to 
the book (which began as lectures at Columbia and Cambridge) as his re-
engagement with the ‘relevance of humanism’ at a time when the ‘setting’ of 
humanism is being dramatically transformed, especially in the wake of 9/11 since 
when, in one view, ‘Islamist’ extremism has confirmed the location of humanism 
only in the enlightened West where the practitioners of humanism feel that true 
humanism has been violated by unruly intruders with their ‘disreputable 
modishness … uncanonised learning’. This narrow affirmation of an exclusivist 
humanism is what Said sets out to challenge as he did in his 1978 masterpiece 
Orientalism. After examining an ambivalence, an ‘increasingly global 
predicament’ as James Clifford termed it, in that book between Said’s 
commitment to humanism and the subject matter’s antihumanism (Orientalism 
as discursive representation without agencies), something that Said himself has 
subsequently acknowledged, this paper looks at Salman Rushdie’s engagement 
with Islam in the context of Said’s own redefinition of humanism as a universal 
critical practice. 
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Edward Said’s last published work, which went to press weeks before his death in 
September 2003, was Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004). Edward 
Said’s impact on literary and cultural studies has been so huge that there are 
now many scholars who are Said authorities. I am certainly not one of them 
although Said’s works, without necessarily citing them in every instance, have 
been the haunting spectre behind my writings on postcolonial theory, diaspora 
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and multiculturalism. I cannot claim any degree of mastery of the Said 
bibliography which is, in a direct way, an admission of scholarly inadequacy in 
respect of the subject matter addressed here (2009). With this confession, I turn 
to his posthumously published work because as W. J. T. Mitchell observed in his 
excellent homage to Said, “any continuation of the conversation with Edward 
Said would have to include the question of humanism and its many discontents” 
(2005, p. 99). 
 
For the past few years I have been reading the Salman Rushdie Archive and 
annotating his major works. In the Archive deposited in the Woodruff Library of 
Emory University, there are marginal comments on Edward Said by Rushdie, 
including a transcript of an interview with Said. The 1986 transcript was included 
in Imaginary Homelands (Rushdie, 1991, pp. 166-184). The occasion for the 
interview was the publication of Said’s After the Last Sky, a collaborative venture 
with the photographer Jean Mohr, the title itself taken from a poem, “The Earth 
is Closing on Us”, by the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish (1999). The 
themes that interest Rushdie, and which forms the basis of his questions, are: 
the insider/outsider problematic when the history of Palestine has turned the 
Palestinian Arab insider into an outsider, the Palestinian interiority as a function 
of an outsider’s discourse, the matter of exile and diaspora, of landless people 
and their notions of a homeland, the idea of excess for the exile as public 
intellectual because he is “obliged to carry too much luggage” (1991, p. 176), 
the problems of narrative ordering when existence itself is discontinuous, and 
related matters. To transform these themes into an historical narrative—the 
themes disrupt a uniform, teleological narrative—on two occasions Said 
specifically refers to Midnight’s Children. “It is like trying to find the magical 
moment when everything starts, as in Midnight’s Children”, and again, says Said, 
“that is the central problem. It is almost impossible to imagine a single narrative: 
it would have to be the kind of crazy history that comes out in Midnight’s 
Children, with all those little strands coming and going in and out” (1991, p. 
179). 
 
Rushdie turns to Said again in his later collection of essays, Steps Across the Line 
(2002). In the section entitled ‘Columns’ there is a brief defence of Said’s 
autobiography Out of Place (“October 1999: Edward Said”) which begins with the 
opening sentences of Said’s book: “All families invent their parents and children, 
give each of them a story, character, fate, and even language. There was always 
something wrong with how I was invented” (as cited in Rushdie, 2002, p. 282). 
Rushdie called the autobiography a great memoir (reading Joseph Anton one 
detects some intertextual indebtedness to Said’s autobiography there) and 
makes it clear that since inventions and blurrings are part of memory and recall, 
the criticism of Justus Reid Weiner, resident scholar at the Jerusalem Centre for 
Public affairs, that there is no historical record that Edward was actually born in 
Jerusalem or that his father owned a house there (a title search shows names of 
other owners) has a subtext: Said cannot claim to have been driven out of his 
homeland to Cairo after the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict because his family was 
never in Jerusalem in the first instance. Of course in extended families and in 
Arab clans (even Christian ones) ownership is never straightforward, and 
documents do not have the same auratic value. But that is not the point because 
other evidence of his school days in eastern Jerusalem is certainly available. 
What Weiner wishes to deny Said is the right to claim any association with 
Palestinian refugees because he wasn’t one, and therefore by extension also 
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weaken his own work as a strong defence of the Palestinian cause. I do not know 
the details of the case but I am interested in the filiations, the lines of 
connections, of flight, between Rushdie’s reading of the memoir and his earlier 
interview and the case for humanism that Said makes in his last published work.       
 
I want to read Humanism and Democratic Criticism not as the summation of 
Said’s forty-year engagement with literary and cultural studies and with the 
plight of the Palestinians but as an engagement with a problematic that has been 
at the centre of his writings, and by extension at the centre of Salman Rushdie’s 
creative output. Said refers to the book (which began as lectures at Columbia 
and Cambridge) as his re-engagement with the “relevance of humanism” (2004, 
p. 6) at a time when the ‘setting’ of humanism is being dramatically transformed, 
especially in the wake of 9/11 since when, in one view, Islamist extremism has 
confirmed the location of humanism only in the enlightened West. This narrow 
affirmation of an exclusivist humanism is what Said sets out to challenge, but 
first he reflects on his own path-breaking work, the 1978 masterpiece 
Orientalism.  
	  
Said turns, with characteristic openness and self-reflection, to James Clifford’s 
memorable 1980 review of the book (later included in his own influential 1988 
book The Predicament of Culture [pp. 255-76]). In his review Clifford, in Said’s 
paraphrase, had noted “the conflict between my (that is Said’s) avowed and 
unmistakeable humanistic bias and the antihumanism of my subject and my 
approach” (2004, p. 8). Orientalism was an essentialised project (the 
representation of the East because they didn’t know how to represent 
themselves within rational, Enlightenment categories) which required methods 
critical of the “totalizing habits of western humanism”, methods which as any 
reader of Said’s magisterial work knows, is indebted to Foucault’s foundational 
works on discourse and power. As Clifford reads Orientalism, Said wishes to have 
it both ways, but it is a posture which is symptomatic of an ‘increasingly global 
predicament’ where humanism finds itself ambivalently located in an 
overpowering but pervasive critical and cultural theory where agency is 
progressively located within systems which are primarily functions of the two 
great founders of discursivity, Marx (on capital) and Freud (on psychoanalysis). 
Said confesses that Clifford gets it right because he too was the product of the 
60s and 70s theory of the death of the subject, and of grand narratives. But the 
ambivalence that Clifford detects also points to Said’s own insistence on 
humanism as the “achievement of form by human will and agency” because it is 
“neither a system nor impersonal force like the market (Marx) or the unconscious 
(Freud)” (2004, p. 15) with the proviso that Said never saw humanism primarily, 
emphatically and unquestionably as totalising. If the orientalists brought a 
narrow perspective, the fault was not with humanism but with its instrumental 
application, the same kind of distinction that Kant made in his memorable letter 
“What is Enlightenment?” Said makes his position clear in the following passage 
which, although a little long, must be cited in full. 
 
I believe then, and still believe, that it is possible to be critical of humanism in the 
name of humanism and that, schooled in its abuses by the experience of 
Eurocentrism and empire, one could fashion a different kind of humanism that 
was cosmopolitan and text-and-language bound in ways that absorbed the great 
lessons of the past from, say, Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer and more recently 
from Richard Poirier, and still remain attuned to the emergent voices and currents 
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of the present, many of them exilic, extraterritorial, and unhoused … For my 
purposes here, the core of humanism is the secular notion that the historical 
world is made up of men and women, and not by God, and that it can be 
understood rationally according to the principle formulated by Vico in New 
Science, that we can really know only what we make or, to put it differently, we 
can know things according to the way they are made … historical knowledge 
based on the human being’s capacity to make knowledge, as opposed to 
absorbing it passively, reactively, dully. (2004, pp. 10-11) 
 
Following his hero Giambattista Vico, the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher, 
Said addresses humanism in this fashion because so many of the liberal 
practitioners of humanism feel that true humanism has been violated by unruly 
practitioners (races, nations, the multicultural, the multilingual) who have 
brought “disreputable modishness … uncanonised learning” (2004, p. 18) to the 
gates of humanism.1 It is clear that the subtext of the critique is of course 
‘Eurocentrism’, in itself a key pillar of European faith. Eurocentric humanism is 
based on principles of withdrawal and exclusion, not on participatory democracy. 
It is a humanism of secrecy which disavows its own principles of sapere aude; it 
is a humanism that fails to see that its principles have always unearthed 
historical injustices because the past is not fixed, it is not canonical or canonised, 
it is an uncompleted history. To know that uncompleted history or to complete 
the project of a true modernity, humanism has to be delinked from Eurocentrism 
and made into a feature of the human mind itself, not just the European mind. 
The move here is to dehistoricise humanism, that is, to shift proprietorial claims 
to it, so that, shall we say, Bhishma’s lengthy oration on his death bed in the 
Book of Drona in the great Hindu epic the Mahabharata is humanistically and 
intrinsically interesting because it is a profound meditation on the ritual of battle, 
on blood sacrifice and on the idea of the nation itself. 
 
Bhishma’s meditation is of course in Sanskrit. To read it well requires us to know 
the language and to understand how the mind expresses questions of ethical 
responsibility, precisely the overriding issue in the Mahabharata, in itself, at one 
level, a document of civilisation which is also a document of barbarism—
something that a critical humanism will always know. And this is deeply, 
unquestionably and profoundly at the heart of humanism. How do we understand 
Bhishma’s predicament, how do we read it sensitively, comparatively, both on its 
own terms and in terms of our global responsibility? How do we get around Saul 
Bellow’s condescending phrase, “I’ll read Zulu writing when you can show me a 
Zulu Tolstoy” (or was it Proust?). For the practice of this new humanism the 
aesthetic becomes important. Said quotes a passage from Richard Poirier’s The 
Renewal of Literature in which he had written, “language is also the place 
wherein we can most effectively register our dissent from our fate by means of 
our troping, punning, parodistic echoings, and by letting vernacular energies play 
against revered terminologies” (as cited in Said, 2004, p. 29).The quotation 
reminds us that Said’s humanism is not the diametric opposite of the decentering 
of origins in favour of beginnings found in poststructuralist/posthumanist 
thought, and especially in Derrida who, referring to one’s ethical responsibility, 
had emphatically stressed, in a manner not dissimilar to Said’s, that “one must 
be just without being noticed for it” because ethical responsibility requires a 
                                       
1 See Said in Representations of the Intellectual: “Giambattista Vico, who has long been 
a hero of mine” (1994, p. 45). 
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messianic impulse without a Messiah who is only “the name of a possibility” 
(1997, p. 107-108). 
 
Said feels most comfortable with literary texts and it is in literature that he finds 
the most exciting and productive ways in which the Eurocentric assumptions 
about humanism may be challenged. As late modernists, and those of us not 
constrained by ideological absolutism, including that of religion, know only too 
well literatures do not exist only within national contexts, nor are they 
generically stable. Which is why a nationalistic humanism no longer provides all 
the critical tools; but religious enthusiasm too has its dangers. The coupling of 
nationalistic humanism with religious enthusiasm by Said is conscious because 
both produce intolerance and an inhumane world view. So a critique of 
Eurocentrism in so far as it challenges forms of absolutism, and recognises the 
“contradictory, even antinomian and antithetical currents running” (2004, p. 45) 
in our complex world, is also a challenge to anti-secular and anti-democratic 
polities in the name of religion. These currents find their expression in the 
aesthetic domain, and for our purposes, in literature where the turn to philology 
is a legacy of the humanist enterprise. This philological turn need not be a Dr 
Casaubon-like (in Middlemarch) reactionary learning that would lead to the key 
to all mythologies. What this turn requires is attention to detail and an openness 
to the language of the text; if done well it leads to what Said calls ‘heroic first 
readings’ by us in response to a recognition of authorial heroism.  
 
I wish to turn to Said’s spectres of humanism by bringing into dialogue Said and 
the writer with whose interview and review essay we began this presentation. 
The writer in question, Salman Rushdie, is also ambivalently located in 
postmodern minor narratives and a humanist understanding of deep structure, 
the former the world of surfaces, of the collapse of the high and low, the latter 
the wish to know, the wish to dismantle Eurocentric assumptions and deconstruct 
orientalist representations. I wish to advance the dialogue by two moves. The 
first is through a critical deployment of Said’s references to a specifically Arabic 
hermeneutics to Salman Rushdie’s own engagement with Islam’s holy book. And 
second, embedded in the first, is through a form of textual criticism that engages 
with vernacular resistance. Both moves grow out of Said’s own understanding of 
humanism as an inclusive critical practice. 
 
Said very correctly critiques a humanism that locates itself centrally within a 
Western intellectual tradition that refuses to admit an unruly multicultural mob 
knocking at its doors. Humanism in this reading is defiantly canonical and 
dismissive of any alternative splitting of reason. Humanism here can only be 
practised by people who can locate themselves unproblematically in an 
essentialist Western tradition or who can be easily assimilated into it, notably 
someone like Said himself. Said’s critique, as we have already outlined, is strong, 
principled and in the end unarguably sensible. What is less obvious is his critique 
of those exclusive institutions such as religion that refuse critical engagement 
with an alternative humanism finely attuned to modern realities. What is Said’s 
take on the sacred which, after Vico (one of his heroes), is unknowable and 
therefore inconsequential because it is not ‘man’ made? To Islam, it may be 
argued, and persuasively I think, Said continues to bring an uncritical, perhaps 
even a romantic, vision, primarily because he separated the secular from the 
sacred. And this poses a serious problem because the primacy of the sacred in 
Islam as a social formation as well as a belief system is non-negotiable. For Said 
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the two has to be differentiated and it is sufficient to show that Islam, as a social 
formation rather than as a religion, is woefully misunderstood by the West (and 
by China and India too, let us add).  
 
The role of humanist criticism with reference to the Islamic sacred cannot be 
ignored and the question one asks is: What then of an Islamic humanism 
incapable of addressing the ‘constructedness’ of its holy book, a text which too 
had an historical beginning and is therefore made by us and is part of the larger 
humanist project? Let us, therefore, turn to a model of critical thinking that Said 
advances in the few paragraphs in which he places a schema for heroic first 
reading on Islamic principles. Said’s interest here is in presenting another 
humanistic heroism with its ‘own built-in constraints and disciplines’ which can be 
placed in dialogue with our received ideas about humanism. Let us follow Said’s 
synopsis of what he has called this “common enterprise” (2004, p. 68), an 
enterprise little known among Eurocentric scholars but, I suggest, certainly 
known to Orientalists who didn’t think it merited attention. 
 
The Qur’an, Said correctly points out, is in Islam the ‘Word of God’ which, by 
virtue of its unmediated, unwritten utterance, can never be known fully. But it 
has, miraculously (some of these modalities are my own not Said’s) come to us 
as a written text and must therefore be subjected to some kind of literal 
paraphrase with the explicit proviso that others have already attempted a 
paraphrase. What is then established is a continuum of witnesses in the act of 
reading which makes any reading dependent on the chain of witnesses. Reading 
therefore becomes systemic and is called isnad, the common goal of which (as 
the product of interdependent witnesses) is to arrive at the usul (the text’s 
ground or essence). There is a ‘model’ reader here, a reader willing to commit 
himself to finding the ‘truth’, the act itself called ijtihad (a word that derives from 
the same root as jihad or holy war). So in this sense, although Said himself does 
not tarry here, the effort has the sense of religious piety, and linked to the 
question of ‘permissibility’. To whom is ijtihad available is another matter; is it 
available to everyone or as the scholar Ibn-Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) says only 
to the as-salaf al-salih (pious forerunners) who should be followed? Although this 
reading has been challenged, it remains the dominant mode of interpretation in 
Islam. Said adds, quite correctly, that it is wrong to say that alternative positions 
have not been advanced in Islam but what this paradigm of interdependent 
witnesses points to is the limits to what is permissible. To understand a text’s 
rhetorical and semantic structures, one works within a certain law, within the 
requirements of jurisprudence; in short there is an ethics of responsibility in 
interpretation from which it follows that “one cannot just say anything one 
pleases and in whichever way one may wish to say it”. We are reined in by this 
“sense of responsibility and acceptability” (2004, p. 69).  
 
Said’s example is given as an instance of the need for a critical dialogue between 
textual paradigms, the point here being that an Islamic hermeneutic is not unlike 
a humanist hermeneutic as both work from similar principles. What is not taken 
up is the question of textual authority and the extent to which an Islamic 
hermeneutic has sealed itself off from the principles of Western humanist textual 
criticism. The equivalent of the system of interdependent readings or isnad in the 
Western tradition began with the scholia tradition of annotations. The agential 
noun form of the word ‘annotate’ (from the Latin ‘annotāt-, participial stem of 
annotā-re or adnotāre to put a note to; the latter from ad to + notā-re to mark’), 
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annotator, meaning “one who annotates or writes notes to a text”, first appeared 
in 1663. Two citations later, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED 2nd ed.) cites 
the early orientalist Henry Thomas Colebrooke’s observation on Sanskrit textual 
annotators (1808): “A crowd of annotators whose works expound every passage 
in the original gloss”. Colebrooke’s reference to “a crowd of annotators” points to 
an annotating principle which was the dominant form of textual criticism in pre-
colonial India. The annotator in this reading of his craft was an interpreter if not 
a co-author of the text, written or oral. The defining feature is a different, anti-
auratic reading of text and author, both of which were seen as collective 
products of culture. The Indian epics stand out pre-eminently in this respect but 
so do two of the great annotations of the Bhagavadgītā, the Hindu revealed or 
śruti text—the gītābhāṣyas of the advaitic Śankara and the viśiṣtādvaitic 
Rāmānuja—where commentaries immeasurably transformed the ‘original’ text 
(which of course had undergone its own internal annotations, interpolations and 
variant readings before, as a fixed religious document, it arrived at its final form 
around the time of Christ (Gambhirananda, 2000; Sampatkumaran, 1985).  
  
Colebrooke’s comments on Sanskrit annotations may be conveniently, but 
incorrectly, dismissed as ‘orientalist’ irony. I consider them as a scholar’s 
recognition of cross-cultural Indo-European continuity. To him Sanskrit textual 
annotations are part of the tradition of the classical scholia, or commentaries, 
and scholiasts, or commentators, who provide us with tools which we now refer 
to as textual criticism, a rigorous methodology about which, in 1913, the Biblical 
scholar Alexander Souter wrote in the context of the New Testament recensions, 
“if we possessed the twenty-seven documents now composing our New 
Testament exactly in the form in which they were dictated or written by their 
original authors, there would be no textual criticism of the New Testament” 
(1913, p. 3). Often the word ‘Enarratio’, “an expository narrative, designed for 
guidance and education”, would be attached to the work of a scholiast such as 
Asconius’s commentaries on Cicero (AD 54–57) and of the Eastern Greek scholar 
Eustathius (c. 1115– c.1195), whose description of the first line of the Iliad alone 
runs to ten pages. The principles of literary scholarship inaugurated by these 
early scholiasts have become the stock-in-trade of humanist textual criticism. In 
establishing the text of Homer, for instance, textual variants were noted, 
different styles were recognised (the story of Dolon in the Iliad X was looked 
upon with considerable suspicion since its style was so different from the rest of 
that epic), use of words in an author’s entire corpus was seen to be a necessary 
guide to meaning and nuanced semantics and commentaries in which alternative 
readings were offered became indispensable. 
 
Textual emendations, allegorical readings, comparative study of manuscripts, the 
construction of a proto- stemmatic theory of recension are some of scholiast 
legacy. The tradition so inaugurated was used in biblical scholarship where as 
early as the fifth century Procopius of Gaza (c. 460 – c.530) began what is 
known as the catena (which is something like the scholia) where running 
commentaries on a book of the Bible  quoted sometimes verbatim the “opinions 
of several previous interpreters” (Reynolds & Wilson, 1991, p. 53).2 I refer to the 
                                       
2 The Greek Bible made its way into the Orient and both in Syriac and in Arabic there 
were commentaries on it. As a general rule, though, the Arabic versions of Greek texts 
were of little use when it came to establishing the original Greek text. This negative 
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humanist scholia tradition and to the foundational principles of textual criticism 
to point to Said’s own blindness even as the insight into the Islamic 
hermeneutical tradition is canvassed. Although, Said, quite correctly, points to 
the limits of humanist interpretation (there is a juridical frame of reference that 
limits what is permissible), the fundamental fact of humanist textual criticism—
the text itself as an editorial problem—is not addressed via a western humanist 
methodology when it comes to the Qur’an. I have quoted Souter’s comments on 
New Testament textual recensions. For Said, one suspects, the textuality of the 
Qur’an is out of bounds, only the interdependent readings are legitimate points 
of entry.  
 
Said’s references to responsibility, jurisprudence and permissibility in respect of 
the Islamic hermeneutical tradition functions as a corrective to Swift’s parody of 
‘out-of-control subjective frenzy’ in A Tale of the Tub. I have a strong suspicion 
that the ‘out of control frenzy’ that Said speaks of was directed not so much 
towards Swift (valuable as he is as an analogy) but to the unnamed Salman 
Rushdie. I began this paper with Salman Rushdie’s interview of Edward Said. I 
wish to spend the second half by looking at Rushdie as the exemplary humanist 
in terms of Said’s own definition of the heroic humanist who like Said is 
ambivalently located between postmodern theory and humanist foundationalism, 
and occupies the position of both the “insider and outsider” (2004, p. 77) in the 
circuit of ideas. What is a humanist challenge to textual authority? What is his or 
her relationship to blasphemy in the context of discrepant and mutually exclusive 
jurisprudence? In writing about Islamic commentarial tradition why was Said 
silent about both Rushdie and the place of blasphemy in Islam? And what of the 
work of ‘witnesses’ who are not pious forerunners?   
 
My point of entry is the stoning of the apostle Stephen in Acts of the Apostles. 
Chapters six and seven of Acts (the entire book is addressed to one Theophilus) 
are devoted to the Stephen. Chapter 5 had already introduced us to the Council 
of Jewish elders who concerned with the proselytising methods of the apostles 
wanted them killed. They are saved by a Pharisee named Gamaliel who basically 
argued that the apostles should be left alone. If what they preached came from 
men, their ideas would disappear; if indeed they came from God then we have 
no choice but to listen to them, “lest haply ye be found even to fight against 
God” (5:39). These are the early years of the Christian church (we may want to 
recall even now that the intertext of The Satanic Verses too are the early years 
of the Islamic church) and we get, along with theology, a schematic  sociology of 
the foundational moments of the Christian Church. Stephen comes into the 
picture literally out of nowhere because the apostles require someone to look 
after their finances and the material well-being of their members. There is some 
                                                                                                                        
reading of Arabic contribution, at least in one instance, argue Reynolds and Wilson is 
unjustified. I quote them at this point:  
 
In Aristotle’s Poetics the Arabic text, though exceptionally difficult to understand, offers a 
few readings which the editor must accept and several more which he must consider 
seriously, a reasonable harvest if the brevity of the treatise is borne in mind. That the 
Poetics should have been translated is a cause of some surprise at first sight; but the 
explanation of both the Syriac and Arabic renderings may be simply that all writings of ‘the 
master of those who know’ were held to be important enough to justify translation. For the 
most part, however, it was science and philosophy that interested the Arabs. (1991, p. 56) 
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strife between converts especially in respect of the treatment of widows and it is 
the latter’s material needs which require special redressing. Clearly Stephen is a 
brilliant accountant, a great debater as well as a miracle-worker. Such a 
combination in a man can be dangerous and often it is those who have recently 
acquired freedom who find such a person threatening. So, recently freed Jewish 
slaves (by the Romans) foment strife. They bribe their own kind who now 
declare, “We have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses, and 
against God” (6:11). Stephen is caught in a bind: witnesses have declared that 
he has blasphemed. How does he get out of it? His case is doomed even as he 
mounts a theological defence in which he retraces God’s covenant from Abraham 
down to Jesus. And yet he makes no critical re-appraisal of the Mosaic ‘law’ of 
blasphemy under which he has been condemned. The synopsis has considerable 
rhetorical power and is even novelistic in its design but its very ingenuity triggers 
memory of the Old Testament God’s own treatment of blasphemy. In Leviticus 
24:10–16 we get the incident of the Egyptian-Israelite man who during a quarrel 
with an Israelite “blasphemed the name of the Lord, and cursed” (24:11). He is 
taken to Moses for judgement and Moses in turn waits for God to tell him what 
punishment should be meted out to him. And God replies,  
 
Bring forth him that hath cursed … and let all that heard him lay their hands upon 
his head [to testify that he is guilty], and let all the congregation stone him. And 
thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying, Whosoever curseth his God 
shall bear his sin. And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely 
be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the 
stranger, as he that is born in the land [the foreigner as well as the Israelite], 
when he blasphemeth the name of the LORD, shall be put to death. (24:14–16) 
 
This is the law as we find it when we turn to the full text of Stephen’s defence 
that follows the accusation. The witnesses (which include jurists) testify, one 
presumes falsely, before the Council of Jewish elders that “we have heard him 
say, that this Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy this place and shall change the 
customs which Moses delivered us” (6:14). Witnesses declare that he has 
blasphemed; God had earlier declared that this is acceptable testimony. The 
defendant’s penalty is death by stoning.  
 
As Acts presents it, the charge is of course trumped up. The constructed crime, 
quite conveniently, is: he had spoken against God and his prophet Moses. And it 
seems that under the Mosaic code this is as blasphemous as you can get. 
Stephen’s speech, which takes up all but two or three verses of chapter seven, 
rehearses Jewish resistance to the ‘Holy Spirit’, their failure to observe God’s law 
and acknowledge the coming of the ‘Just One’, the promised Saviour, who was in 
fact murdered by them. The speech, in terms of the failure of the Jews to uphold 
the austere monotheistic covenant between God and Abraham, reads very much 
like a synopsis of the Qur’an with the difference that in the latter the covenant 
gets qualified via Muhammad and not via Christ. Stephen’s defence, however, is 
too much for the jury and witnesses stone him to death as Saul is seen 
“consenting unto his death” (8:1). Acts begins to read like a novel as we know 
that this Saul, as Paul, the great Jewish convert, will soon become the ethical 
voice of Christianity through the letters he will write to the foundational Christian 
churches and their key players. 
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In the case of Stephen blasphemy is a useful excuse for punishment. We do not 
know what the other crime of the part-Israelite was in Leviticus but we may 
suspect that witnesses there too found blasphemy a very convenient excuse for 
killing off troublesome people. This is not to say that blasphemy has no historical 
power or that it has a purely ideological function; rather it co-exists with religion, 
belief, God and society which is why laws against blasphemy exist in so many 
countries. This much is clear from the OED. The word comes from the Greek 
βλασφηµία via Latin blasphēmia, meaning slander, blasphemy. The first meaning 
is given as “profane speaking of God or sacred things; impious irreverence”. The 
first OED citation around 1225 is from Middle English (Þe seoueđe hweolp is 
Blasphemie, “that seventh hweolp is Blasphemy”). Caxton (1488) defines 
blasphemy as speaking “unhonestly of god” and Milton (1659) “blasphemy or evil 
speaking against God maliciously”. By 1768 (Blackstone) we get a meaning that 
touches more directly on our subject matter: “blasphemy against the almighty, 
by denying his being or providence”. The word also has a more common 
figurative and general meaning. In figurative use we find Bacon 1605 writing 
about blasphemy “against learning” for which one is punished. The general 
meaning—slander, evil speaking, defamation is now obsolete—and the OED has 
no citation after 1656: “To speak evil of any man is blasphemy”. Except for the 
1768 quote most of these are not particularly helpful. How does one define 
“unhonestly” (Caxton), or “maliciously” (Milton)? Only Blackstone is clear: 
blasphemy involves denying God’s being and his role as the guardian of his 
creation. The OED does not help us when it comes to representation of God. Nor 
does it give us citations that show the consequences of blasphemy. There is no 
citation from Leviticus or from Acts. When does one cross the line in representing 
God in art? To what extent can one rewrite or change religiously iconic and 
culturally endorsed representations of God? This becomes a matter not of 
epistemology but of law and of legal interpretation which is governed by the 
social mores of the time. Given our subject matter we need to turn to blasphemy 
in Islam. 
 
In Islam blasphemy, although more marked, is far less doctrinal, and textual 
support from the Qur’an is not readily forthcoming. ‘Blasphemy’ in Arabic has 
two words: tajdīf, a more religiously specific term, and sabb, a more general 
word for irreverent attitudes. The first does not occur in the Qur’an, while the 
second does but without a religious meaning. Sabb, meaning ‘revile’, occurs in 
an ambiguous passage in the Qur’an where God seems to be condoning heresy 
(ilhād) and unbelief (kufr) which, along with polytheism (shirk) are unpardonable 
sins in Islam. 
 
Do not revile the idols which they invoke besides God, lest in their ignorance they 
revile God with rancour. (6:108)3 
 
Arabic scholars, however, have pointed out that even if the two common words 
for blasphemy do not make their way into the Qur’an, it does not follow that the 
‘intent’ of that word (as we understand it in Judaeo-Christianity) is non-existent. 
They point to Sura 7:180 where the verb alhada carries this meaning of the word 
(Netton, 1996, p. 3).4  
 
                                       
3 All translations are from N. J. Dawood’s The Koran (1999). 
4 The next few paragraphs draw upon Netton’s work (1996). 
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God has the Most Excellent Names. Call on Him by His Names and keep away 
from those that pervert them. They shall receive their due for their misdeeds. 
(7:180) 
 
Here ‘pervert’ is a clear injunction against profanity. However, it is not so much 
the presence of a single word that is offensive (as is the case with blasphemy in 
the Bible) but rather the totality of relations across a number of words found in 
the Qur’an which is important. Thus blasphemy is not simply reviling God 
through language, but a Muslim’s total attitude towards kufr (unbelief), ilhad 
(heresy) and shirk (polytheism) that becomes important. But above and beyond 
all this is the figure of Islam’s prophet Muhammad. Indeed, such is his 
extraordinary reverence among believers that, in many ways, it is a lesser crime 
to ‘blaspheme’ against God than to doubt Muhammad’s role as the ultimate and 
final prophet before the Day of Judgment. Although he never claimed to be 
anything other than mortal, Islam stands and falls on the inviolability of his 
personage. There is a telling Persian adage which makes this clear: bā khudā 
diwānā basad, bā Muhammad hoshiyār (‘you may take as many liberties as you 
like with Allah, but beware of transgressing Muhammad’). 
 
There is much in the Rushdie Archive at Emory University that shows Rushdie’s 
fascination with blasphemy, religion, the nature of God and the unquestionable 
nature of the Qur’an as the unedited word of God: nothing out of place, the 
words as recited by Muhammad upon the instigation of Angel Gabriel. It is like 
śruti texts of the Vedas, unauthored, unmediated, in need of no amanuensis, 
although no Muslim would condone this connection with the texts of a 
polytheistic religion. The archive is large and its entry points many. My task is 
limited as my aim is to explore the genesis of Rushdie’s interest in the Qur’an 
and, concomitantly, the genesis of The Satanic Verses by examining what Said’s 
new humanistic criticism would have looked like had he linked the Islamic 
hermeneutical tradition of reading the Qur’an with the scholiast tradition of 
annotation and textual criticism. For the point is that in an inclusive humanism, 
as Said himself had noted alluding to Vico, the world is made by men and 
women, and not by God. Did Rushdie, like Stephen in Acts of the Apostles, mean 
to offer another, synoptic, narrative of a holy book? When did his interest in the 
genesis of secrecy in Islam begin? Was there a conscious plan to deconstruct the 
Qur’an itself? And was he aware of the consequences of such an undertaking?5 In 
terms of Said’s humanism and democratic criticism are these not centrally 
questions that a humanistic critic would ask? The matter of textual authority is 
paramount because for the written word text and transmission constitute the two 
crucial elements of humanist exegesis.  
 
In the Rushdie Archive there is an undated sheet of paper (which we may date 
November 1987) where we read: “I’ve been waiting 20 yrs to write about the 
incident of the satanic verses” [ca. 1987]. If we go back in time “20 yrs” this 
places Rushdie more or less in his final year at Cambridge University (1965-8). 
In Joseph Anton: A Memoir (2012, pp. 38-45) we read that in his final year, “at 
the ripe old age of twenty”, he “found out about the satanic verses” (p. 38). In 
                                       
5 The opening day is Valentine’s Day, Tuesday 14 February 1989, the day of Khomeini’s 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie: “'I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the 
author of the ‘Satanic Verses’ book … and all those involved in its publication who were 
aware of its content, are sentenced to death. I ask all the Muslims to execute them 
wherever they find them’” (2012, p. 5). 
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Part Two of the History Tripos he was expected to choose three subjects from a 
wide list. He chose colonial Indian History since the Indian Mutiny (1857 – 1947), 
the first century of American Independence (1776–1877) and for his third, 
“Muhammad, the Rise of Islam and the Early Caliphate”. Unfortunately too few 
students chose the last of these papers, which was cancelled. Rushdie, himself 
godless but after his father “fascinated by gods and prophets” (2012, p. 39), 
persevered and persuaded a King’s College medieval historian Arthur Hibbert to 
supervise him. Under his guidance Rushdie read a paper which was not offered 
again, at least not in the foreseeable future. Hibbert, Rushdie recalls, taught him 
two things: historical training required one to study events inside history 
“analytically, judiciously, properly”; it also demanded that one should be able to 
hear the historical subjects speak (2012, p. 40). The summary that he gives 
about the birth of one of the world’s great religions is written with these 
principles in mind. 
 
The background to the genesis of Islam is to be located in the battle between a 
recently urbanised, patriarchal, ruling class and an older, matriarchal nomadic 
people denied access to wealth and power. Both were polytheists with the 
difference that the polytheistic gods of the new class had been transformed into 
kinds of tax-gatherers controlled by the rich families of the newly established city 
Mecca. Pre-eminent among these gods were the three Winged goddesses Al-Lat, 
Al-Manat, and Al-Uzza located at the gates through which caravans passed. To 
them offerings were made. There were hundreds of gods elsewhere and in the 
centre of the town in a building known as Kaaba (the Cube) there was a 
nonspecific ‘all-rounder of a deity’ called Al-Lah who would soon be appropriated 
by a new religion as the supreme, ever-present, omniscient, omnipotent 
monotheistic God. The revolution against the ruling class took the form of a new 
religious ideology created by an orphan, one Muhammad ibn Abdullah of the 
Banu Hashim family, later a merchant who journeyed with his uncle Abu Talib 
primarily to Syria. Here, as Rushdie’s Cambridge studies showed (and Cambridge 
one must add has a library with an unparalleled collection on the Orient) this 
Muhammad came into contact with Nestorian Christians who had adapted many 
of the Biblical stories to suit their own local conditions. Rushdie mentions the 
case of the Nestorian belief that Jesus was born under a palm tree in an oasis, 
which is how the birth of Maryam’s child in sura 19:22–25 is described. 
Muhammad, an astute and honest merchant, at the age of 25 married Khadijah, 
an older and much wealthier woman. A man prone to meditation and a desire for 
solitude, Muhammad would retreat into a cave on Mount Hira in search of peace 
of mind. It was on Mount Hira that from the age of forty onwards he begins to 
get visions of the Angel Gabriel from whom he receives the message of God 
known as the Qur’an. The message led to the formation, initially, of a small 
group of followers whose leader Muhammad, was both Prophet, a Messenger of 
God, as well as military strategist. The social dimension of the message grew out 
of the nomadic values of a matriarchal culture and, in part, because of this the 
followers of the new religion (not unlike the early Christians whose lives are 
extensively recounted in the letters of Saint Paul) continued to struggle for social 
and political legitimacy. Muhammad himself it seems, although a successful 
merchant, could not break into the closed circle of the Mecca ruling class.  
 
It is at this point that Rushdie comes across the possibility of an act of 
compromise on the part of the Prophet of Islam. To break into the circle of the 
Meccan, polytheist, ruling class, might it not be desirable to accommodate some 
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if their gods into the new religion? A political act of compromise no doubt but 
might it not be worthwhile, for the moment at any rate? The evidence is tenuous 
and for the believer totally inadmissible but in the "Hadith, or traditions, about 
the life of the Prophet" one encounters what "became known as the incident of 
the satanic verses" (2012, p. 43). The account given, apocryphal to many but to 
a historian politically very possible, deals with Muhammad’s recitation of a verse 
in his first version of sura 53 (‘The Star’) which contained the words: “Have you 
heard of al-Lat and al-Uzza, and al-Manat, the third, the other one? They are the 
exalted birds, and their intercession is greatly desired” (43). Later (the duration 
is never known) after yet another encounter with the Archangel, he returns to 
denounce the verses as a deception played on him by Satan who had appeared 
to him in the guise of Angel Gabriel. There may be many reasons for this 
change: his followers may have rejected the compromise; his amanuenses found 
the qualification contrary to the austere monotheism of the overall message; or 
any appeasement was a sign of weakness. Thus in the ‘revised’ version after the 
first sentence we read in Sura 53, “They are but names that your forefathers 
invented, and there is no truth in them. Shall God have daughters while you 
have sons? That would be an unjust division” (44).  
 
A writer teases meanings out of historical and pseudo-historical material, indeed 
from any kind of narrative. Did the momentary compromise increase 
Muhammad’s chances of getting a seat on the city council as orientalists like W. 
Montgomery Watt and Maxine Rodinson have argued? Did his religion, for the 
moment, attract many more pagans who preferred a modified monotheism with 
their beloved goddesses having a role to play alongside Allah, as angels do? Did 
the compromise fail because the city’s grandees renege on the deal? “It was not 
possible to say for sure”, writes Rushdie and adds, “imagination had to fill in the 
gaps in the record” (2012, p. 45). Two further points arise: one eschatological, 
the other proto-feminist. On the first score sura 22:51 reminds us that all 
prophets have been tempted by Satan at some stage in their careers. There is 
thus nothing extraordinary about the temptation of Muhammad, who like all 
other prophets, comes out of this temptation with flying colours. The second 
point is disconcerting. It was “clear”, suggests Rushdie, that “it was the 
femaleness of the winged goddesses” which was disturbing to the new revelation 
(2012, p. 45). Being female they would be inferior and could not be children of 
God, as the angels were.  
 
Sometimes the birth of a great idea revealed things about its future; the way in 
which newness enters the world prophesied how it would behave when it grew 
old. At the birth of this particular idea, femaleness was seen as a disqualification 
from exaltation. (Rushdie, 2012, p. 45) 
 
When Rushdie read about the incident in his final year at Cambridge he was 
taken in by the remarkable nature of the story. It had great potential for a 
novelist, something he didn’t know then. He filed it away in one part of his brain. 
“Twenty years later he would find out exactly how good a story it was” (2012, p. 
45) concludes Rushdie not without a sense of irony. 
  
The writer, Rushdie notes, agrees to a ruined life and in an inversion of the 
Faustian contract, “gains, if he is fortunate, perhaps not eternity, but, at least, 
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posterity” (n.d.-a).6 This humanist gesture extends to Rushdie’s conscious 
invocation of Dante, Robert Southey (who told a friend that Byron’s Don Juan 
should have been called ‘The Satanic Verses’), Voltaire, Defoe (who provides the 
epigraph to the novel) and, above all, Blake whose cryptic line “without 
Contraries is no progression” (1988, p. 34) explains many of the notes in the 
archive.7 Against the oppositions, against the active-passive, we get the old 
middle voice, the voice of deferral, the voice of the différance. Rushdie’s archive 
does not mention this word, but it is clear that he has the same kind of interest 
in philology that Said writes about. There are a number of places in the archive 
where Rushdie jots down derivations of words. In one instance he notes that the 
word ‘babble’ comes from the Dutch ‘babbelen’ (via Latin babulus) and has 
nothing to do with the ‘Babel’ of the Book of Genesis which quite possibly is from 
the Assyrian babilu meaning ‘gate of God.’ There is an undecidable aspect to 
meaning which is not captured in the oppositions of ‘compromise/no 
compromise’, ‘angels/devils’, ‘secular/profane’, ‘black/white’ and need to be 
replaced or rethought through words whose semantic configurations are always 
in flux and are in a sense ‘in process’. 
 
A belief incapable of being metamorphosed (or to use Rushdie’s own neologism 
‘metaphorphosed’), a belief marked by “one one one … [a] terrifying singularity” 
(Rushdie, n.d.-a), leads to melancholia since the singularity destroys the very 
idea of contraries (after Blake). The imagination is hedged in and finds little 
room to manoeuvre because with the loss of multiplicity, paradoxically enough, 
comes the death of God. The legacy of Muhammad is to leave behind a God who 
is dead because he and his message become more powerful than God. Notes 
Rushdie, “objective information about him [Muhammad] is forbidden … there is a 
saying: ‘you can say what you like about God but be careful with Muhammad’” 
(1989).8 
 
                                       
6 In Joseph Anton (2012) we read, “Throughout the writing of the book [The Satanic 
Verses] he had kept a note to himself pinned to the wall above his desk. ‘To write a book 
is to make a Faustian contract in reverse, it said. To gain immortality, or at least 
posterity, you lose, or at least ruin, your actual daily life’” (2012, p. 91). The title of the 
novel, The Satanic Verses, when translated into Urdu (Shaitāni Āyat), into Farsi (Āyat-e-
Shaitāni) or into Arabic (Āyat al-Shaitāniyya) gives rise to disturbing hermeneutic 
possibilities since the word for verse (āyat) is used to refer to the suras in the Qur’an 
itself. The unease one has is that such possible readings may trigger a very different kind 
of reception of the title of Rushdie’s book in speakers of these languages. These 
associations are certainly not available to speakers of other languages such as Hindi 
where the translation is śaitāni kāvya or Sanskrit where the translation is asurim śloka. 
7 On a single sheet (Rushdie, n.d.-a) a list of ‘contraries’ is placed under the headings 
“Chamcha” and “Gibreel”. So under Chamcha we get: Devil-angel, Translated 
(‘metaphorphosed’), Reason, West (deracinated), Pale, Quiet (introvert), Doubt, Secular, 
Compromise, Day, Dreamless, Conquering (sullen), Shaitan, whereas under Gibreel we 
are given: Angel-devil, Translating (‘metaphorphosed’), Fantasy, East (racist!), Dark, 
Loud (extrovert), Certainty, Religious, Extreme, Night, Dreamfilled, Conquered 
(madness), Gibril. Each of these items has its corresponding contrary (as in Blake). It is 
interesting that on the same page Ally is also mentioned like a mediating (feminist?) 
principle and linked to the pagan goddess Allāt (Al Lat) with items such as “process”, 
“life”, “hard”, and “struggle”, under her name.   
8 Photocopy of an interview in The Sunday Times, 22 January 1989, some three weeks 
before the fatwa. 
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The Satanic Verses negotiates the difficult terrain of literary representation in 
Islam and after René Girard’s work shifts the focus from ‘effects’ to textuality as 
it examines the place of allegorical readings in literature, the nexus between the 
novel and belief and the need to overcome the mediator (on the part of both the 
narrator and the character) before a new form of knowledge can come into being 
(1976). In a note in the archive Rushdie referred to ‘freedom of thought’ in the 
same manner in which Said had referred to a humanist criticism that would be 
the property of everyone and not simply that of Europe. Rushdie continued, “I 
find myself thinking that one day the Muslim world will realise, as post-
Enlightenment Europe has realized, that freedom of thought is precisely freedom 
from religious control. And I hope that the Muslim world will come to accept the 
truth of what I’ve been saying all these years—that the row over The Satanic 
Verses is, at bottom, an argument about power, about who has power over the 
Story” (n.d.-b).  
 
I turn to Said’s published lectures on humanism with which I began this essay. 
The penultimate chapter of the book is an essay on Auerbach’s magnificent 
Mimesis, “an exile’s book” (2004, p. 97), which Said says, embodies “the best in 
humanistic work that I know” (p. 85). Throughout the lectures Said singles out 
Auerbach as the exemplary humanist critic and thinker, an example of a 
humanistic practitioner of the highest order, a writer whose work is the “hallmark 
of philological hermeneutics” (2004, p. 92).The influence of Giambattista Vico too 
is clear: each age has its own method for “seeing and then articulating reality” 
(2004, p. 91) and since human beings make their own history authors enter into 
dialogues with each other across historical divides (2004, p. 91). In the first, and 
for many the most brilliant, essay in Mimesis (‘Odysseus’ Scar’) Auerbach argues 
that Homer conceals nothing; there is no devious design in the epic poet, he is 
simply a harmless liar. Biblical stories and let us add Qur’anic narratives too are 
a different matter. Their narrator, the Elohist, or the Islamic Prophet is a political 
liar who presents his stories as historical truth and invests them with 
psychological depth and moral values. There is something terribly ‘tyrannical’ 
about this narrator who presents God’s gift of death to Abraham as an absolute 
covenant between man and God. And yet in Stephen’s retelling he supplants the 
Elohist and becomes the Homeric narrator who conceals nothing.    
 
Like Homer Rushdie too seems to conceal nothing. The Satanic Verses is an 
instance of a heroic reading, one that confirms Said’s own definition of a 
humanistic critique that is not simply the property of the West. It uncovers an 
alternative tradition of textual witnessing, in this instance, a critical extension of 
the tradition of interdependent readings called isnad. The usul, the truth, 
uncovered here disrupts the tradition through an extraordinary effort, through an 
ijtihad that is not culture-specific but draws on a humanistic universalism. It is 
arguable that in the case of Rushdie he crossed the juridical lines of 
permissibility and in that sense abrogated his right to engage with a great and 
honoured holy text. But this is exactly what Stephen had done in his re-writing of 
the grand biblical narrative in his legal defence. My point is that Rushdie engages 
in pushing humanistic boundaries, precisely the challenge posed by Said’s 
lectures on humanism, and by Auerbach’s own discussion about how Christianity 
shatters the “classical balance between high and low” (2004, p. 106). 
Regrettably when it came to Islam Said himself did not push these boundaries to 
the same extent, preferring to leave his observations simply as an Islamic 
hermeneutical paradigm that Western critics have ignored. There are many 
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moments in Said’s reading of Auerbach when the Qur’an (which like the New 
Testament has also been prefigured in the Old Testament) could have been used 
as another proof text. Apart from a reference to Goethe’s interest in the Persian 
poet Hafiz and in the idea of absolute submission on the part of the Muslim, Said 
does not push the insights of Auerbach towards an understanding of the Islamic 
text. It is an act which would have demonstrated how a post-orientalist critique 
actually works. Rushdie did not ignore the paradigm but showed that for the 
Islamic textual hermeneutic of a ‘chain of witnesses’ to enter into a dialogue with 
modernity it too has to incorporate precisely the modes of textual questioning 
enshrined in the received scholia tradition. Good theory, as in the case of Said’s 
reflections on humanism, and great writing, as in the case of The Satanic Verses, 
engage with the same problematic: how to make the outsider an insider, and 
how to make the principles of humanism part of collective everyday life, how, 
like Auerbach’s Dante, to show that the past is realised in the present through 
figurality and how to “reconstruct the history of [one’s] own time as part of a 
personal commitment to the field” (2004, pp. 115-6) to make knowledge and not 
be its passive receptacle. Humanism is not an exclusive system restricted to a 
canonical understanding of the Western intellectual tradition alone; it finds 
exemplary form only when, as in the case of Auerbach or Rushdie, there is a 
clear admission that one can understand the world, humanistically that is, “from 
the limited perspective of one’s own time and one’s own work” (2004, p. 117). 
And in spite of Said’s silence on the textuality of Islam’s holy book, Humanism 
and Democratic Criticism makes the Other no longer an unruly mob knocking on 
the doors of a Eurocentric humanism but a group which extends the boundaries 
of humanistic criticism and makes it part of a robust, critical, self-reflexive 
participatory democracy. In this context Said himself would have acknowledged 
our right to read his own works not as exemplary gospel truth but as works that 
attempt to think through what James Clifford said were the totalising habits of 
Western humanism. 
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